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Introduction
The self as an entity distinct from other human conspecifics
may be described as an enduring and spatial entity (the
feeling that we are the same person across time and space)
to which certain mental events and actions are ascribed (the
feeling of agency; being author of one’s own thoughts and
actions) and which is distinct from the environment [1].
The many concepts of the self have been influenced by
theology, philosophy, and psychology [2–4,] but also by
clinical observations from the fields of neurology and
psychiatry [1,5–7,8••]. One group of clinical phenomena
may be especially fruitful in this respect: autoscopic
phenomena (AP). During AP, the individual sees a second
own body in extrapersonal space, associated to varying
degrees by a separation of the self from the body. AP
challenge our notions about the experienced unity of self
and body, localization of the self, and agency [2,4,9•]. This
review describes recent scientific approaches to AP and
body and self processing and makes testable predications
for future research.
Autoscopic phenomena generally are classified among
disorders of somatognosia and include various short-
lasting (usually), illusory experiences about the location
and position of one’s body or body parts [10–12]. They
generally occur in patients with posterior brain damage
and are characterized by illusions that only affect a certain
body part (body-part illusions) or affect the entire body
(body illusions or AP) [8••,10,12]. Recently, phenomeno-
logic, functional, and anatomic mechanisms of AP and
their importance for mechanisms of self processing have
been reported [5,8••,13,14••]. It has been speculated that
these phenomenologic characteristics point to similar and
distinct neurocognitive mechanisms in the three main
forms of AP [5,8••].
Definition of the Three Main 
Autoscopic Phenomena
During an out-of-body experience (OBE), people seem to
be awake and feel that their “self,” or center of awareness,
is located outside of the physical body and is somewhat
elevated (disembodiment). It is from this elevated extra-
corporeal location that the subjects experience seeing their
body and the world (for overview see [8•,13,14••,15,16]).
The subjects’ reported perceptions are organized in such a
way as to be consistent with this elevated visuo-spatial
perspective. Therefore, an OBE can be defined as the
presence of disembodiment, distanced and elevated visuo-
spatial perspective, and autoscopy.
During an autoscopic hallucination (AH), a person
experiences seeing his double in extracorporeal space
without leaving his own body (no disembodiment). As
compared with OBEs, individuals with AH experience
seeing the world from their habitual visuo-spatial perspec-
tive and experience their “self,” or center of awareness,
inside their physical bodies.
Lastly, during a heautoscopy (HAS), the individual also
has the experience of seeing a double of himself in extra-
corporeal space. However, it is difficult for the subject to
decide whether he is disembodied and whether the self is
localized within the physical body or in the autoscopic
body [8••]. In addition, the subjects often report seeing
Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are rare, illusory visual 
experiences during which the subject has the impression 
of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space. AP 
consist of out-of-body experience, autoscopic hallucina-
tion, and heautoscopy. Recent neurologic reports support 
the role of multisensory integration deficits of body-
related information and vestibular dysfunctions in AP 
at the temporo-parietal junction. A caveat to test the 
underlying neurologic and cognitive mechanisms of AP 
has been their rare and spontaneous occurrence. Recent 
evidence linked AP to mental own-body imagery engaging 
brain mechanisms at the temporo-parietal junction. 
These recent observations open a new avenue for testing 
AP-related cognitive mechanisms in selected clinical and 
normal populations. We review evidence on several 
clinical syndromes (psychosis, depression, anxiety, deper-
sonalization, body dysmorphic disorder), suggesting that 
some of these syndromes may relate to AP-proneness, 
thereby leading to testable propositions for future 
research on body and self processing in addition to AP.
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the physical body and the double’s body. For additional
details see Brugger [14••] and Blanke et al. [8••].
Neurology
Etiologic mechanisms
Autoscopic phenomena have been reported in various
diseases of the central nervous system and may be attribut-
able to generalized disease (meningitis, encephalitis, intoxi-
cations, generalized epilepsies) or focal disease (focal
epilepsy, traumatic brain damage, migraine, vascular brain
damage, neoplasia) [5,8••,13,17]. In regard to focal brain
damage, these studies primarily implicated posterior brain
regions, including the temporal, parietal, or occipital lobes
[5,13]. More recently, Blanke and Arzy [18], Blanke et al.
[8••,19] and Maillard et al. [20] suggested that AP may
be related primarily to damage at the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) of either hemisphere.
Functional mechanisms
Many different functional mechanisms have been pro-
posed in the study of AP, including visual (hallucinatory)
mechanisms, proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic mecha-
nisms, and vestibular mechanisms (for discussion see
Devinsky et al. [13] and Brugger et al. [5]). More recently,
Blanke et al. [8••] suggested a differential implication
of vestibular processing in the different forms of AP.
These authors suggested systematic differences in the
strength of a vestibular dysfunction in AH, HAS, and OBE.
The role of the vestibular system for AP also is supported
by descriptions of vestibular sensations during AP in
healthy populations [15,16,21]. Blanke et al. [8••] sug-
gested that OBEs were associated with a gravitational,
otolithic, vestibular disturbance, whereas the vestibular
dysfunction in patients with HAS is more variable and
often is characterized by rotational components. Vestibular
dysfunction was absent in patients with AS. Based on
this neurologic evidence, these authors suggested that AP
may relate to dysfunctional multisensory integration at the
TPJ [8••]. Additional vestibular dysfunctions may be
irrelevant for AH, but are increasingly important in HAS
and OBE. Although these propositions seem promising,
the rarity of AP in clinical and healthy populations renders
their experimental investigation difficult.
There are several studies that provided theoretical
propositions for experimental studies with respect to AP
[14••,15,22,23]. Concretely, these studies suggested that
brain mechanisms engaged during mental own-body
transformations may rely on similar brain mechanisms to
those underlying AP. We recently did a series of experi-
mental studies to test some of these propositions [9•]. In
an evoked potential mapping study, we showed the selec-
tive activation of the TPJ at 330 to 400 ms after stimulus
onset when healthy volunteers imagined themselves in
the position and visual perspective generally reported by
people experiencing spontaneous OBEs. In an indepen-
dent study sample, we showed that interference with the
TPJ by transcranial magnetic stimulation at that time
impaired the mental transformation of the own body
in healthy volunteers relative to transcranial magnetic
stimulation over a control site at the intraparietal sulcus.
No such inference was observed for imagined spatial trans-
formations of external objects, suggesting the selective
implication of the TPJ in mental imagery of one’s own
body. Lastly, in an epileptic patient with OBEs originating
from the TPJ, we showed partial activation of the seizure
focus during mental transformations of her body and
visual perspective mimicking her OBE percept. These
results suggested that the TPJ is a crucial structure for the
conscious experience of the normal self mediating spatial
unity of self and body.
Taken together, the aforementioned clinical and experi-
mental findings suggest that deficient multisensory
integration (involving visual, somatosensory, and vestibu-
lar processing) and mental own body imagery (involving
visuo-spatial perspective taking, self-location, and spatial
unity) seem crucial for our understanding of deviant self-
processing as occurs during AP. In addition, the use
of mental own-body transformation using paradigms
implicating imagery perspective changes and imagery self-
location may allow linkage of lower level multisensory
processing with higher level processing in regard to body,
self, and AP.
Yet, given that AP occur spontaneously and rarely in
normal, neurologic, and psychiatric populations and
rarely in neurologic patients, we propose that it may
be favorable to additionally screen and investigate indi-
viduals from healthy and psychiatric populations who
may have an enhanced risk and/or chance to experience
an AP. This is additionally developed in the remainder of
this article. First, based on the illusory character of
AP and the link between epilepsy and psychiatry [24,25],
we discuss scientific evidence regarding psychotic popu-
lations as a potentially “AP-prone” population. We also
discuss other AP-prone populations (individuals with
depression, anxiety, depersonalization, and body dys-
morphic disorders), who may be likely candidates for AP
because of previously reported multisensory integration
deficits and vestibular dysfunctions (We refer mainly to
recent studies for two reasons. First, these studies use
current diagnostic criteria [Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, International Classification of
Diseases of the World Health Organization]. Second, an
extensive historical overview is beyond the scope of this
article. The reader can obtain more information in the
cited articles). We also discuss the potential implication
of the TPJ in these syndromes.
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Psychosis
Aberrant bodily experiences have been described as core
features in schizophrenia [26,27] (see [28–30] for recent
overviews). Schneider [31] described delusional percep-
tions and somatic and passivity experiences as first-rank
symptoms of schizophrenia; they also have been referred
to as a loss of “Meinhaftigkeit” (mineness). Recent descrip-
tions of body-image aberrations in patients with schizo-
phrenia include perceptions of alterations in the size
and shape of the own body, feelings of bodily unreality,
merging of the body with external objects, and of the
own body as not belonging to oneself [28]. Röhricht and
Priebe [30] described enhanced body sensations of numb-
ness and/or stiffness, desomatization, abnormal pain,
emptiness, heaviness, lightness, falling and/or sinking, lev-
itation and/or elevation, diminution, shrinking, enlarge-
ments, or constrictions (see also [27]). A major part of
these symptoms also have been described by neurologic
patients with AP [5,8••].
Angyal [27] presented a patient with schizophrenia
perceiving an “alter ego” (or Doppelgänger). APs have
been considered visual pseudohallucinations [8••,14••]
and may be conceptualized as just another positive symp-
tom in psychosis [32•]. However, Blackmore [33] and
Röhricht and Priebe [29] found no evidence for a higher
prevalence of OBEs in patients with schizophrenia when
compared with healthy control subjects.
A recent study reporting somatic delusions in psychosis
included AP as a distinct category [32•]. The authors assessed
somatic delusions in many patients with depression, mania,
chronic schizophrenia, and acute schizophrenia, respectively.
The finding most relevant to this article is the observation
that only acute psychotic patients reported loss of boundary
(3.2% of psychotic patients; e.g. “other bodies intermingled
with mine”) and AP (2% of psychotic patients; “standing
outside myself looking at myself” [OBE], or “can see inside
myself from a height “[OBE-like]). These findings from
McGilchrist and Cutting [32•] may point to a link between
AP and schizophrenia, but only when patients have acute
psychotic symptoms.
Further support for a link between positive psychotic
symptoms and AP has been provided from healthy schizo-
typal individuals [34,35]. These authors observed that
healthy individuals, who have experienced an OBE at least
once in their lifetime, also reported higher positive, but
not negative, schizotypal thoughts. Moreover, those who
experienced OBEs also were those who were more prone to
experience other positive “psychotic-like” experiences, such
as hallucinations and involuntary imagery in situations of
mild sensory limitation and physical relaxation compared
with subjects who never experienced an OBE [34]. The
relationship between OBEs and positive “psychotic-like”
experiences is additionally supported by studies that
have shown that people with OBEs also had elevated para-
normal belief scores [36] and reported hallucination-like
experiences more frequently [37••] (additional informa-
tion linking OBE with personality, behavior, or drug use
can be found elsewhere [38,39]).
Based on the previously described neurologic data, we
also expected to find multisensory and vestibular deficits
specifically related to positive psychotic or schizotypal
symptoms and/or to the TPJ. Unfortunately, reports on
multisensory integration in schizophrenia (see [40] for
review), particularly multisensory integration of bodily
information, are relatively sparse (see [41,42] for reviews).
In the study by Spence et al. [41], patients showing passiv-
ity symptoms (such as loss of agency and/or alien control)
were asked to move a joystick with the right hand to the
sound of auditory stimuli. Compared with normal control
subjects and patients without passivity symptoms, this
patient population showed a hyperactivation of right
inferior parietal lobule and cingulate gyrus. Farrer et al.
[42] tested action attribution in patients with Schneiderian
first-rank symptoms. The task required self-other decisions
about seen hand movements on a computer screen.
Crucially, the spatial match between own hand position
and the one seen on the screen was distorted gradually.
Supporting previous reports that the right inferior parietal
lobule is involved in the attribution of action to another
agent [43], increased brain activity in the right angular
gyrus was observed in the normal participants with
increased deviance of seen hand positions from their own
hand positions. In first-rank patients, this relationship was
absent or much weaker and correlated positively with first-
rank symptoms. The authors also reported that the lack of
increase in activation caused by increasing degrees of
distortion among in these patients was associated with an
abnormally high level of activation in the perfectly match-
ing condition (an increased activity that only appeared for
the “other” condition). Therefore, the patients showed
high activity in the right angular gyrus when they experi-
enced being the agent of their actions, whereas this activa-
tion in normal control subjects is only seen when agency is
allocated to another person.
Even less is known about vestibular dysfunction in
schizophrenia. Early reports described a reduced reactivity of
the vestibular system in (mainly catatonic) patients with
chronic schizophrenia [44]. However, a subsequent review
disqualified vestibular dysfunctions of peripheral or central
origins in schizophrenia [45]. However, as argued for a
relationship between psychosis and AP, vestibular dysfunc-
tions may only be relevant when patients show acute
symptoms [46]. To our knowledge, there are no research
findings applying contemporary methodologies to study the
vestibular system in positive psychotic patients.
The lack of consistent reports of AP in schizophrenia
may be explained as follows. First, AP have not yet been
related systematically to positive symptoms in schizophre-
nia because studies rarely distinguished between acute and
chronic symptoms and medication. Second, the lack of
reports of AP in psychosis may be the result of the fact that
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known experiences (see [47] for a similar argument on
olfactory hallucinations). Lastly, for patients with active
psychotic symptoms, AP experiences may be just another
odd experience that they do not consider worth mentioning.
Depression, anxiety, depersonalization, and body 
dysmorphic disorders
As will be shown in more detail below, depression, anxiety,
depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorders are
frequent comorbidities [48–50]. Moreover, they also have
been linked to (acute) psychosis and aberrant body experi-
ences. Therefore, within the scope of the current report,
it seems appropriate to treat them together. Our goal is
to elucidate whether these syndromes may represent “AP-
prone” subpopulations and whether multisensory and
vestibular processing deficits and an implication of the TPJ
have been described.
A link between AP and the latter syndromes has been
hypothesized previously [17,51–54]. Chapman et al. [28]
noted that patients with schizophrenia do not only have
more body image aberrations as compared to normal
control subjects, but that body image aberrations
increased as a function of individuals’ scores on the Beck’s
depression inventory. Dening and Berrios [17] reviewed
patients with AH and HAS and found that more than
50% of patients studied suffered from depression
followed by schizophrenia. Anxiety was comorbid in
approximately 30% of patients with depression. Although
information about depersonalization was not available
for many patients, 27% of the AP patients for whom
this information was provided received the additional
diagnosis of depersonalization.
Aberrant body experiences are phenomenologically
reminiscent of AP and are common in patients with
depersonalization and body dysmorphic disorders.
Murray and Foxe [55] have shown that healthy subjects
with OBEs score higher on the somatoform dissociation
scale and the body satisfaction scale. Depersonalization
and body dysmorphic disorders were formerly classified
as anxiety disorders, whereas today, depersonalization is
classified as a dissociative disorder and body dysmorphic
disorders are classified as somatoform disorders [56].
Criteria of depersonalization include persistent or recur-
rent experiences of feeling detached from one’s mental
processes or body [56]. Criteria for body dysmorphic
disorders include obsession about the size and shape
of different body parts [56]. Although they are considered
to be distinct syndromes, both are closely related with
anxiety and depression [30,50,57]. Röhricht et al. [30],
for instance, reported a significantly increased amount
of body dissatisfaction, high amount of somatic com-
plaints, somatic depersonalization, and boundary loss
in patients with depression and anxiety as compared
with normal control subjects. In a study testing a large
population of patients with depersonalization disorders,
Axis I comorbidity of anxiety and depression were the
most prevalent [58].
With respect to multisensory and vestibular deficits in
these syndromes, multisensory integration deficits have
been reported in patients with state and trait anxiety
[59,60]. Vestibular dysfunctions have been associated with
depression, anxiety, and depersonalization [49,61,62].
Anatomically, anxiety, depression, depersonalization, and
body dysmorphic disorders have been linked with the
heteromodal association cortex such as the TPJ [57,63–67].
Simeon et al. [57] tested brain metabolism in eight
patients with depersonalization and 24 healthy control
subjects using positron emission tomography. The most
important finding was that patients showed higher meta-
bolic rates in parietal and temporo-parietal cortices. More-
over, there was a positive correlation between the
relative glucose metabolism and the degree of dissociation
and/or depersonalization. Using lesion analysis, Sierra et
al. [63] observed depersonalization symptoms in a patient
subsequent to a right subdural hematoma predominating
in the right parietal lobe. Lastly, Osuch et al. [65] used
positron emission tomography in medication-free patients
with depression. Their results showed that these patients’
state anxiety correlated inversely with metabolic rate at the
TPJ (at the angular gyrus).
Multisensory integration deficits, vestibular dysfunc-
tions, and an implication of the TPJ have been reported
in patients with anxiety, depression, depersonalization,
and body dysmorphic disorders. This phenomenologic
and experimental evidence suggests that these syndromes
may be promising research targets to further our under-
standing of the functional mechanisms (multisensory
and vestibular processing) and neural mechanisms of
AP at the TPJ and other brain areas. Unfortunately, the
comorbidity of the syndromes (including psychosis)
makes a more refined selection of AP-prone individuals
almost impossible. For instance, anxiety has been related
to schizophrenia [26,68] schizotypy [69], depression
[70], dissociation and/or depersonalization [58], and
body dysmorphic disorders [71]. Furthermore, depression
and depersonalization are associated with the schizo-
phrenia spectrum [72,73], especially for patients during
an acute phase of their illness [74]. However, it may be
suggested that anxiety is the strongest predictor for AP
given the important role of vestibular dysfunctions in
anxiety [62]. Given the presumable role of anxiety as
discussed previously, we suggest that anxiety is most
closely linked to the form of AP that is characterized by
complete disembodiment (as in OBE), also attributable
to the vestibular involvement in anxiety and OBEs. How-
ever, AH may instead be linked to depersonalization and
body dysmorphic disorders, in which multisensory body-
related information processing is disturbed without the
significant implication of vestibular dysfunctions.
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The current review indicates that a more detailed question-
ing of patients with AP by neurologists and psychiatrists
is mandatory. To differentiate between the different forms
of AP and their respective incidence in the different
syndromes, future studies need to refine the questions that
are asked about AH, HAS, and OBEs. Most studies to date
only used Palmer’s question ([75] question 23): “Have you
ever had an experience in which you felt that “you” were
located “outside of” or “away from” your physical body;
that is the feeling that your consciousness, mind, or center
of awareness was in a different place from your physical
body?” McCreery and Claridge [37••] questioned the
specificity of Palmer’s question, stating that this question
includes a wider range of unusual experiences different
from OBEs. Therefore, to differentiate between AH, HAS,
and OBE, future investigators should not only specify
disembodiment, but also ask about autoscopy (Does the
subject experience seeing her own body during the AP?)
and the subject’s visuo-spatial perspective during the
experience (Does the subject experience seeing her own
body and space from her habitual body-centered perspec-
tive or from an elevated and distanced extracorporeal
perspective?). The accurate description of these three main
phenomenologic characteristics of AP will not only allow
to differentiate between the different AP-forms (AH, HAS,
and OBE), but also between AP and other phenomena
such as depersonalization or the feeling of a presence [76].
In science the most challenging phenomena often are
the ones we take for granted in our everyday lives. Excellent
examples are the self and the experienced spatial unity
(between self and body). Folk and psychologic notions
are challenged by AP. The reviewed evidence from neuro-
logic and psychiatric patients experiencing these striking
dissociations between self and body suggests that AP are
culturally invariant phenomena that can be investigated
scientifically. The neuroscientific study of the self is in its
infancy and there are currently no established models, very
little data, and often not even the vocabulary to describe
neuroscientific notions of the self [1]. The investigation of
AP in specific neurologic and psychiatric populations and
their neural mechanisms may allow improvement of our
neuroscientific models of self and corporeal awareness.
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